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"A Pious Fraud":
The Prohibition of Conditional Guilty
Pleas in Rhode Island,
Marjorie Whalen*
1. Thomas Paine, author of the famous revolutionary pamphlet
Common Sense, published The Age of Reason in colonial America in the late
eighteenth century. In The Age of Reason Paine attacked the Christian
religion and its defining ideas as irrational. Paine took the extreme position
that churches "institutionalized fraudulence," and that they "were neither
legitimate nor productive of any social good." Email from Drew McCoy, Ph.D,
Jacob and Frances Hiatt Professor of History, Department of History, Clark
University, to author (Nov. 11, 2011, 7:21 PM EST) (on file with author). The
phrase "a pious fraud" in the title of this comment is a reference to a
particular passage in The Age of Reason:
It is possible to believe, and I always feel pleasure in encouraging
myself to believe it, that there have been men in the world who
persuaded themselves that what is called a pious fraud, might, at
least under particular circumstances, be productive of some good.
But the fraud being once established, could not afterwards be
explained; for it is with a pious fraud as with a bad action, it begets a
calamitous necessity of going on.... From the first preachers the
fraud went on to the second, and to the third, till the idea of its being
a pious fraud became lost in the belief of its being true; and that
belief became again encouraged by the interest of those who made a
livelihood by preaching it.
THOMAS PAINE, THE AGE OF REASON 74 (Moncure Daniel Conway ed.,
Merchant Books 2010) (1896).
* Candidate Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2013;
M.P.A. Clark University, 2009; B.A. Clark University, 2008. The author
would like to thank Andrew Horwitz and Drew McCoy, as well as the Notes
& Comments team and the Articles Editors for their invaluable assistance,
and the members of the Law Review and the students and faculty who
contributed to this comment. Special thanks to Beth, Kelly, Kevin, Anna,
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INTRODUCTION
In Rhode Island, a defendant's "guilty plea represents a break
in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal
process." 2 When a defendant pleads guilty, his position in Rhode
Island's criminal justice system has been irreversibly altered, and
perhaps the most significant alteration is the defendant's loss of
appellate rights. 3 This sounds like a very sensible proposition;
why should an individual who has accepted responsibility before a
court for a criminal act have any rights whatsoever? This
comment argues that Rhode Island should, as the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and a majority of states do, allow defendants
to enter conditional guilty pleas.
While Rhode Island's traditional plea regime may serve the
interests of justice in some cases, it is at war with efficiency and
pragmatism in a particular type of recurring case, specifically,
where defendants make case-dispositive pretrial motions.4
Defendants who make case-dispositive pretrial motions have a
difficult choice when contemplating a plea bargain. A frequent
example of such a situation is where a defendant moves to
suppress evidence before trial, arguing that the government's
search violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. If the
defendant loses his motion to suppress, as is common, he may very
well be left with no live issues to litigate. However, if the
defendant prevails on his motion to suppress, the government is
Hattie and Lili for all their love, encouragement and inspiration.
2. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); accord State v.
Keohane, 814 A.2d 327, 328-29 (R.I. 2003) (per curiam).
3. See Keohane, 814 A.2d at 328-29. Even in jurisdictions like Rhode
Island that do not permit conditional guilty pleas, defendants may appeal the
entry of the guilty plea itself, such as on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel, but may not appeal any substantive issues. See Alexandra W.
Reimelt, Note, An Unjust Bargain: Plea Bargains and Waiver of the Right to
Appeal, 51 B.C. L. REV. 871, 877 (2010) (explaining that the Supreme Court
has held that double jeopardy and ineffective assistance of counsel claims
survive a guilty plea).
4. It should be noted at the outset that, in jurisdictions that permit
them, conditional guilty pleas are used in a relatively small number of cases
because the statutes and court rules that provide for the entry of conditional
guilty pleas contain strict limitations on the applicability of such pleas. For
example, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, upon which many state
statutes providing for conditional guilty pleas are modeled, require the
"consent of the court and the government." FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2).
2012] 481
482 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:480
left without evidence to bring its case. Therefore, the outcome of
the case would have been decided before trial. At this critical
pretrial juncture, the defendant has two choices: he can either
plead guilty and accept a sentence, thereby sacrificing his
constitutional claims, or he can go to trial for the sole purpose of
preserving his right to appeal the denial of his pretrial motion.
Given the near certainty of a guilty verdict and the likelihood of
receiving a greater sentence at trial, defendants who may have
valid arguments on their pretrial claims often plead guilty to
avoid the considerable risk of a trial.
Conditional pleas address this problem by permitting
defendants to plead guilty, and thereby forgo the risks of trial,
while retaining the right to appeal specific pretrial motions. 5
Through a conditional plea, a defendant leapfrogs from the entry
of a plea straight to appeal, avoiding the time and expense of a
trial where the outcome of that proceeding is inevitable. This
procedure serves the judicial system, the public, and other
litigants by preventing the expense and delay of unnecessary
trials and preserving precious space on crowded trial court dockets
for other cases and matters. Conditional guilty pleas also reduce
the likelihood that defendants who have valid constitutional
claims will be coerced into pleading guilty.
Part I of this comment discusses Rhode Island's prohibition of
conditional guilty pleas and searches for the rationale behind the
prohibition in Rhode Island Supreme Court decisions. Part II
provides a survey of other jurisdictions that prohibit conditional
guilty pleas and the arguments against conditional guilty pleas.
Part III examines case law from jurisdictions that allow
conditional guilty pleas and the arguments in favor of such pleas.
Finally, Part IV argues that Rhode Island should permit the entry
of conditional guilty pleas.
I. RHODE ISLAND'S RULE AGAINST CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEAS
AND ITS 'ATIONALE"
The text of Rhode Island Superior Court Rule of Criminal
5. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 24.3(b)
(permitting a defendant to enter a conditional guilty plea and to appeal
"adverse determination of a pretrial motion to suppress seized evidence or a
custodial statement or a pretrial motion to dismiss a charge because not
brought to trial within the time provided in Rule 28.1 (b) or (c)").
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Procedure 11 does not expressly permit the entry of conditional
guilty pleas, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court has recently
stated that it has never sanctioned a plea procedure that would
allow a defendant to plead guilty but preserve his right to appeal.6
Despite several opportunities to do so, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court has not explained the rationale for its prohibition on
conditional guilty pleas.7  Even in the absence of an articulated
rationale, the Court's cases involving conditional guilty pleas
provide some scattered, if opaque, hints at the Court's possible
reasoning.
In Soares, a one-page 1993 order involving a defendant's
appeal of his motion to suppress subsequent to pleading guilty,
the Court rejected the defendant's appeal and remanded the case
to the Superior Court with instructions to vacate the defendant's
plea of nolo contendere.8 In disposing of the defendant's appeal,
the Court tersely remarked that although the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure permit conditional guilty pleas, "there is no
6. See R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 11; State v. Keohane, 814 A.2d 327,
329 (R.I. 2003).
7. See State v. Paiva, 967 A.2d 1103, 1104-05 (R.I. 2009); State v.
Beechum, 933 A.2d 687, 690 (R.I. 2007); State v. Dustin, 874 A.2d 244, 246-
47 (R.I. 2005) (per curiam); Keohane, 814 A.2d at 329; State v. Soares, 633
A.2d 1356, 1356 (R.I. 1993) (mem.); State v. Feng, 421 A.2d 1258, 1263 n.5
(R.I. 1980) (noting that "[a] plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged
offense operates as a waiver of the defendant's right to appeal his conviction
of that offense"). See also State v. Huy, 960 A.2d 550, 558 (R.I. 2008)
(Flaherty, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the ban on conditional guilty pleas
while arguing that a stipulated-bench trial should avoid the waiver rule). It
appears that the Rhode Island Supreme Court first articulated its prohibition
of conditional pleas in Soares. 633 A.2d at 1356 (denying appeal from plea of
nolo contendere and stating that although the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure permit conditional guilty pleas, "there is no comparable Rhode
Island rule"). Conditional pleas themselves are "of relatively recent origin."
1A CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 174 n.1 (4th ed. 2008). Commentators have suggested that the
origin of conditional pleas can be traced to United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d
715, 719 (2d Cir. 1965), and Jaben v. United States, 333 F.2d 535, 538 (8th
Cir.) aff'd, 381 U.S. 214 (1965). See WRIGHT & LEIPOLD, supra, at § 174 n.3
and accompanying text (noting that "[tlhe record, but not the reported
opinions, in Jaben show that [the defendant's] nolo plea" was expressly
conditioned on the defendant's right to appeal the trial court's denial of his
motion to dismiss). Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was
amended in 1983 to provide for the entry of conditional guilty pleas. See FED.
R. CRIM. P. 11(a) advisory committee's note on 1983 amendments.
8. 633 A.2d at 1356.
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comparable Rhode Island rule."9 An interesting aspect of the
succinct Soares order is that the defendant entered not a guilty
plea, but a plea of nolo contendere.10 One argument against
conditional guilty pleas is the perception of a logical inconsistency
in permitting a defendant who has pled guilty to then attempt to
escape punishment on appeal." Clearly, this reasoning would not
apply to a plea of nolo contendere, through which a defendant
accepts a conviction without admitting guilt.12 The Court's refusal
to recognize the defendant's appeal of a pretrial motion
subsequent to a plea of nolo contendere suggests that something
other than, or in addition to, the perception of a logical
inconsistency is behind the Court's prohibition of conditional
guilty pleas.
In State v. Keohane, the Court reached the defendant's appeal
despite the defendant's entry of a conditional guilty plea." The
Court reasoned that although the trial court permitted the
defendant to enter a conditional guilty plea, a denial of the
defendant's appeal likely would have resulted in Keohane
challenging his plea via post-conviction relief. 14 Other courts and
commentators have reached similar conclusions in looking at
court-blessed plea bargains from a contract perspective.' 5 In a
2005 opinion, State v. Dustin, the Court permitted the defendant
to appeal the denial of his pretrial suppression motion after he
"stipulated to the criminal information packet and waived his
right to a jury trial."l6  In consideration of the Court's ban on
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Note, Conditional Guilty Pleas, 93 HARv. L. REV. 564, 569(1980).
12. But see Cote v. State, 994 A.2d 59, 63 (R.I. 2010) ("In Rhode Island, a
plea of nolo contendere is treated as a guilty plea.") (citing State v. Feng, 421
A.2d 1258, 1266 (R.I. 1980)).
13. 814 A.2d 327, 328-29 (R.I. 2003) (per curiam).
14. Id. at 329.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 464 F.2d 937, 945-46 (6th Cir. 1972)
(considering the merits of an appeal because the right to appeal following a
guilty plea was "consideration within the plea bargaining process," even
though the court prohibited subsequent conditional guilty pleas); Reimelt,
supra note 3, at 899-900 (arguing that plea agreements waiving a defendant's
right to appeal are often extracted under coercive circumstances that violate
due process and contract law principles).
16. 874 A.2d 244, 246-47 (R.I. 2005) (per curiam) (footnote omitted). The
criminal information packet included "the narcotics, toxicology reports
identifying the substances as marijuana and cocaine, and a police report
A PIOUS FRAUD
conditional guilty pleas and its rejection of a conditional nolo
contendere plea in Soares, Dustin appears to be somewhat of an
outlier.17 An important distinction between Dustin and the Rhode
Island Supreme Court's other conditional guilty plea cases is that
although the defendant stipulated to the evidence on the record
and waived his right to a jury trial, he did not do so pursuant to a
plea agreement.1 8 In what appears to be an oblique attempt to
narrow its holding, the Court in Dustin noted that it permitted the
defendant's appeal "with reservation" because it found that the
trial court procedure had been "sufficiently adversarial."1 9 The
Court did not indicate what characteristics of the trial court
procedure rendered it "sufficiently adversarial"; instead, it simply
stated that the procedure was so. 20
Identical to the procedure described in Dustin, the defendant
in State v. Paiva did not enter a plea after her pretrial motion was
denied but proceeded to waive her right to a jury trial and
stipulate to the evidence on the record. 21 However, in Paiva the
Court was "concern[ed] that the proceedings below were
insufficiently adversarial," and remanded the case for a
determination of whether the proceedings were sufficiently
adversarial.22 In a strained effort to distinguish Dustin from
Paiva, the Court pointed to "a strong indication on the record"
that the procedure employed in Paiva was a conditional plea
clothed as a jury-waived, stipulated-fact trial.23 Specifically, the
Court cited the trial justice's statement that the proceedings
looked like a "slow guilty plea" and the fact that the trial justice
gave the defendant the immigration warnings that are required
when a defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere. 24 Also bearing
on the Court's analysis in Paiva was the defendant's waiver of a
presentencing report. 25 Curiously, despite its statement that the
detailing the arrest and subsequent search." Id. at 246 n.2.
17. See id. 246-47; State v. Soares, 633 A.2d 1356, 1356 (R.I. 1993)
(mem.).
18. 874 A.2d at 246-47.
19. Id. at 247.
20. Id.
21. See 967 A.2d 1103, 1104 (R.I. 2009); 874 A.2d at 246.
22. 967 A.2d at 1105,
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1104-05.
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trial court lacked the benefit of a presentencing report, the Court
did not bother to explain the purpose, role, or putative benefits of
a presentencing report, or the connection between that report and
the adversarial nature of the trial court proceeding.26 Nor did the
Court address why the procedure in Dustin was "sufficiently
adversarial" despite the absence of a presentencing report, but in
Paiva the defendant's waiver of her presentencing report indicated
that the trial court proceedings might have been insufficiently
adversarial. 27
The Court's attempt to distinguish Paiva from Dustin is
utterly unconvincing. Is the teaching of Dustin and Paiva that
litigants may engage in a conditional guilty plea-like procedure as
long as neither the trial justice nor the parties acknowledge this
truth on the record? The Court has implicitly answered that
question in the affirmative in State v. Beechum. 28
Like the defendant in Dustin, the defendant in Beechum
waived his right to a jury trial and "stood trial without contesting
any facts" after his pretrial motions to dismiss were denied.29
What makes Beechum stand out from the Court's other opinions
addressing conditional guilty pleas is that both the prosecution
and defense attorneys had the gall to admit on the record that
their joint purpose "was to preserve an appeal on the pretrial
motion ... and to avoid the expense and uncertainty of a jury
trial."30 In response, the Court repeated its familiar refrain,
stating that it does not recognize conditional pleas.31
Interestingly, the Court noted that "this procedure ensured the
26. Id. at 1105. One possible reason the Court discussed the
presentencing report in Dustin and Paiva is that the Court was searching for
indications of whether the trial court procedure was "adversarial" or whether
the procedure was tantamount to a conditional guilty plea. Id.; 874 A.2d at
247. In the Court's analysis, the absence of a presentence report seems to
indicate a trial court procedure that was insufficiently adversarial, i.e., a
violation of the Court's rule against conditional guilty pleas. 967 A.2d at
1105.
27. 967 A.2d at 1105; 874 A.2d at 247.
28. See 933 A.2d 687, 690 (R.I. 2007).
29. Id. at 688; 874 A.2d at 246. Unlike the other Rhode Island cases
cited, the Beechum defendant's pretrial motions included "a motion to dismiss
the indictment for undue delay and a motion to dismiss due to allegedly
unconstitutional jury selection." See Beechum, 933 A.2d at 688.
30. 933 A.2d at 690.
31. Id. (citing State v. Keohane, 814 A.2d 327, 329 (R.I. 2003)).
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state a conviction and afforded defendant a reduced charge and a
significantly reduced sentence."32 In Paiva the Court expressed
its aversion to such agreed-upon dispositions, which are
presumptively the inverse of a "sufficiently adversariar'
proceeding. 33 The Beechum Court echoed this sentiment through
its determination that, in light of the mutually beneficial
agreement between the parties, the trial court proceedings in that
case were "tantamount to a conditional plea."34
II. JURISDICTIONS THAT PROHIBIT CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEAS
AND THEIR RATIONALES
Against the backdrop of Rhode Island's case law regarding
conditional guilty pleas, the reasoning of which is cryptic at best,
it is useful to examine the rationales upon which other courts
have relied in prohibiting such pleas. States that prohibit
conditional guilty pleas include Colorado,35 Delaware, 6 Georgia,37
Indiana,3 8 Iowa, 39 Kansas, 40 Maryland, 4 1 New Hampshire, 42 and
South Dakota.43  Prior to the 1983 addition of a provision
authorizing conditional guilty pleas to the Federal Rules of
32. Id.
33. 967 A.2d 1103, 1105-06 (R.I. 2009).
34. 933 A.2d at 690.
35. People v. Neuhaus, 240 P.3d 391, 395-98 (Colo. App. 2009) (holding
that Colorado does not permit conditional guilty pleas), petition for cert.
granted, No. 10SC27, 2010 Colo. LEXIS 646, at *1 (Colo. Aug. 30, 2010)
(granting certiorari to decide "[w]hether the court of appeals erred in
announcing a new rule prohibiting conditional pleas in Colorado, thereby
creating a split in the court of appeals regarding the permissibility of
conditional pleas").
36. DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 11 (LEXIS through 2012 legislation).
37. Hooten v. State, 442 S.E.2d 836, 838-40 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); see GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-7-93 (2008).
38. Alvey v. State, 911 N.E.2d 1248, 1250-51 (Ind. 2009).
39. State v. Stufflebeam, No. 4-129/03-1164, 2004 Iowa App. LEXIS 418,
at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2004).
40. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3602 (2007).
41. Bishop v. State, 417 Md. 1, 16 n.5 (Md. 2010) (noting that Maryland
does not have a rule like Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2), but
suggesting that the Rules Committee "consider whether to recommend the
adoption of a Rule embodying a conditional guilty plea akin to that" in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). See MD. CODE ANN., Pleas, § 4-242(c)
and (e) (LexisNexis 2011).
42. State v. Parkhurst, 435 A.2d 522, 523 (N.H. 1981).
43. State v. Rondell, 791 N.W.2d 641, 644-45 (S.D. 2010).
2012] 487
488 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:480
Criminal Procedure, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits had also disapproved of conditional guilty pleas.44
Arguments against permitting conditional guilty pleas include
"that the procedure encourages a flood of appellate litigation,
militates against achieving finality in the criminal process,
reduces effectiveness of appellate review due to the lack of a full
trial record, and forces decision on constitutional questions that
could otherwise be avoided by invoking the harmless error
doctrine."45  The Iowa Supreme Court, for instance, described
conditional pleas as "ingenious and appealing" but nonetheless
declined to permit them because such a procedure "would create
numerous appellate problems and endless confusion."46 Presented
with a "limited record" of the trial court's hearing on the
defendant's motion to suppress in Cox, the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit found that it was possible to infer that the
prosecution had additional evidence it did not present, and
therefore the constitutional question before the Court might have
been avoided through the harmless error doctrine. 47
Central to the resistance to conditional pleas is a discomfort
with what some courts perceive as a moral and/or logical conflict
presented by conditional pleas. 48 The Indiana Supreme Court has
reasoned that "it is inconsistent to allow defendants both to plead
guilty and to challenge evidence supporting the underlying
convictions."49 According to the Alvey court, defendants should
not be permitted to "benefit from both the advantages of pleading
guilty and the right to raise allegations of error with respect to
pre-trial rulings."50 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire
44. See Neuhaus, 240 P.3d at 394 (citing United States v. Benson, 579
F.2d 508, 509-11 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Nooner, 565 F.2d 633, 634
(10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Brown, 499 F.2d 829, 832 (7th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Sepe, 486 F.2d 1044, 1045 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Matthews, 472 F.2d 1173, 1174 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cox, 464
F.2d 937, 941-42 (6th Cir. 1972)).
45. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.6(b) (5th ed.
2009).
46. State v. Dorr, 184 N.W.2d 673, 674 (Iowa 1971).
47. 464 F.2d at 945.
48. See Cox, 464 F.2d at 942 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 748 (1970)).
49. Alvey v. State, 911 N.E.2d 1248, 1249 (Ind. 2009) (citing Norris v.
State, 896 N.E.2d 1149, 1153 (Ind. 2008)).
50. Id. at 1251.
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articulated a similar concern:
Permitting a defendant to proclaim his guilt in open court
and still avoid conviction is incompatible with the sound
administration of justice .. . . Although some justify the
use of conditional guilty pleas in the name of "judicial
economy," we believe that such a practice can only
undermine the public's confidence in the integrity of the
criminal justice system.5 1
These opinions overlook the separation between factual guilt and
legal guilt, which is discussed below. 52
There is "a certain psychological satisfaction" when a criminal
defendant admits his guilt. 53  One court determined that the
relationship between rehabilitation and the act of pleading guilty
was too significant to dismiss through the authorization of
conditional guilty pleas. 54 "[N]o valid reason exists," that court
reasoned, for allowing defendants who have pled guilty to escape
the effect of their free and voluntary admissions of guilt.5 5
Additionally, in its compilation of model plea standards, the
American Bar Association recommends that courts consider "the
views of the parties, the interests of the victims and the interest of
the public in the effective administration of justice" in the context
of all pleas. 56 One of the chief interests of the state, the public,
and the victims is the finality of criminal justice proceedings.
A less frequently cited factor in the decision to prohibit
conditional pleas is the availability of an alternate route to
judicial review through an interlocutory appeal. In affirming its
prohibition of conditional guilty pleas, the Indiana Supreme Court
noted that the defendant could have requested "certification of the
trial court's ruling for an interlocutory appeal on the denial of his
motion to suppress."57 In general, however, interlocutory appeals
51. State v. Parkhurst, 435 A.2d 522, 523 (N.H. 1981) (internal citation
omitted).
52. See infra Part IV.B.
53. See DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT
OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 96 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1966).
54. Hooten v. State, 442 S.E.2d 836, 838 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
55. Id. at 840.
56. AM. BAR AsS'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF
GUILTY § 14-1.1 (3d ed. 1999).
57. Alvey v. State, 911 N.E.2d 1248, 1250 (Ind. 2009).
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are rarely allowed in such circumstances. 58 A Georgia court that
had previously authorized conditional guilty pleas prohibited
them two years later, in part because a state statute provided
defendants with the option to seek an interlocutory appeal.59
Like Rhode Island, jurisdictions that prohibit conditional
guilty pleas may nonetheless proceed to the merits of a
defendant's appeal from a conditional guilty plea in certain
circumstances. Courts in such jurisdictions have justified judicial
review of prohibited pleas in terms of contract principles and
equity considerations. For example, in Cox, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that conditional
guilty pleas were against sound public and judicial policy and
declared that such pleas would "not be countenanced in the future
in this Circuit."60 However, the Sixth Circuit felt compelled to
honor the agreement between the government and the defendant,
which was premised on the defendant's ability to enter a
conditional guilty plea, because a refusal to do so "would
constitute a failure of consideration within the plea bargaining
process." 61 Similarly, in United States v. Brown, the Seventh
Circuit, citing Cox, expressed disapproval of conditional guilty
pleas but considered the merits of the defendant's appeal on
equity grounds. 62
At least some jurisdictions that prohibit conditional pleas
approve of various procedures that permit defendants to preserve
their appellate rights by participating in a summary "trial,"
sometimes labeled a "stipulated facts trial" or a "slow plea."63 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court has permitted stipulated facts trials
in criminal cases. 64  In a stipulated facts trial, the defendant
58. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a) advisory committee's note on 1983
amendments; LAFAVE ET AL. supra note 45, § 21.6(b) (noting that
interlocutory appeals are rare).
59. Hooten, 442 S.E.2d at 840 (reinstating prohibition of conditional
guilty pleas).
60. 464 F.2d 937, 942-45 (6th Cir. 1972).
61. Id. at 946.
62. 499 F.2d 829, 832 (7th Cir. 1974).
63. See State v. Paiva, 967 A.2d 1103, 1105 (R.I. 2009); LAFAVE ET AL.,
supra note 45, § 21.6(c).
64. See State v. Huy, 960 A.2d 550, 558 & n.8 (R.I. 2008) (Flaherty, J.,
dissenting) (citing State v. Swindell, 895 A.2d 100, 103-04 (R.I. 2006); State v.
Black, 721 A.2d 826, 828 (R.I. 1998); State v. Roberts, 420 A.2d 837, 839 (R.I.
1980)).
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pleads not guilty, and the hearing justice reviews the record to
determine whether the defendant has stipulated to the facts
necessary to meet the required elements of the crime charged.6 5 If
the defendant has stipulated to the necessary facts, the court finds
the defendant guilty. The defendant is then able to appeal an
adverse determination of his pretrial motion. The difference
between a stipulated facts trial and a conditional guilty plea is in
the presence of one word.66 In a conditional guilty plea, the
defendant pleads "guilty," whereas in a stipulated facts trial, the
defendant pleads "not guilty."67 Indeed, the trial court judge in
Paiva remarked that "it is often said that a stipulated fact trial, if
you want to call them [sic] that, are [sic] nothing more than a slow
guilty plea."68
III. JURISDICTIONS THAT ALLOW CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEAS
AND THEIR RATIONALES
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was
amended in 1983 to provide for the entry of conditional guilty
pleas. 69 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2) provides, in
its entirety:
With the consent of the court and the government, a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, reserving in writing the right to have an
65. See Paiva, 967 A.2d at 1105-06; Huy, 960 A.2d at 552-554; State v.
Beechum, 933 A.2d 687, 688 (R.I. 2007); State v. Dustin, 874 A.2d 244, 246-
47 (R.I. 2005) (per curiam).
66. See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 290 n.7 (1975) (explaining
that the "only difference" between a stipulated facts trial and a conditional
guilty plea in New York "is that the plea entered [in a stipulated facts trial] is
labeled a plea of 'not guilty' rather than 'guilty' and there is a stipulation by
the defendant as to the facts the State would prove demonstrating his guilt
rather than a recitation by the defendant in court").
67. Ordinarily, the difference between a plea of guilty and a plea of not
guilty is more significant than in the context of conditional guilty plea-type
procedures. Where the outcome of a trial on the merits is foreordained and
the defendant is simply attempting to preserve for appeal an issue that is
unrelated to factual guilt, such as whether a confession or other evidence was
illegally obtained, it is irrelevant whether that defendant pleads "guilty" or
"not guilty."
68. 967 A.2d at 1105 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a) advisory committee's note on 1983
amendments.
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appellate court review an adverse determination of a
specified pretrial motion. A defendant who prevails on
appeal may then withdraw the plea.
A majority of jurisdictions have since amended their own court
rules or statutes to allow for the entry of conditional guilty pleas,
or have sanctioned such pleas through judicial decision. 70 At least
twenty-nine states, as well as federal courts, the District of
Columbia, and military courts, permit conditional guilty pleas.7 1
Ten jurisdictions have statutes permitting conditional guilty
pleas, sixteen have court rules so permitting, and six other
jurisdictions permit conditional guilty pleas through judicial
decision. 72
Many of the jurisdictions that have adopted conditional guilty
plea procedures have done so on efficiency grounds. For example,
in Cooksey v. State the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that
because a violation of the right to a speedy trial was the
defendant's only issue on appeal, "it would [have] be[en] wasteful
of legal resources to require that [the defendant] undergo a full
trial for the mere sake of preserving the right to appeal the speedy
70. See People v. Neuhaus, 240 P.3d 391, 394 (Colo. App. 2009) ("[A]t
least thirty-two jurisdictions, including federal courts and the United States
military, have approved of conditional guilty pleas.").
71. Id. at 394-95. States that permit conditional guilty pleas include:
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
72. Id. Some states authorize conditional guilty pleas by statute. See
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1237.5 & 1538.5(m) (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-
94a (2009) & Practice Book § 61-6(a)(2)(ii); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-12-204(3)
(2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.035(3) (Lexis-Nexis 2006); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 710.70(2) (CONSOL. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-979(b) (2011);
OR. REV. STAT. § 135.335(3) (2011); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 44.02
(2006) & TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-254 (2008); WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 971.31(10) (West 2007). Some jurisdictions authorize
conditional guilty pleas through court rules. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2); R.
COURTS-MARTIAL 910(a)(2); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 24.3(b); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM.
P. 11(a)(2); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i); HAw. R. PENAL. P. 11(a)(2); IDAHO
CRIM. R. 11(a)(2); Ky. R. CRIM. P. 8.09; ME. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2); N.J. R. CRIM.
P. 3:9-3(f); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 12(I); TENN. R. CRIM. P.
37(b)(2)(A); VT. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2); WYo. R. CRIM.
P. 11(a)(2). Finally, some jurisdictions permit conditional guilty pleas
through judicial decision. Neuhaus, 240 P.3d at 394-95 (listing Alabama,
Alaska, Louisiana, Michigan, New Mexico, and Utah).
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trial ruling" of the trial court. 73 The Fourth Circuit explained that
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorized conditional
guilty pleas "[t]o avoid the waste of prosecutorial and judicial
resources and the delay in the trial of other cases occasioned by
such a litigation strategy." 74 The advisory committee's notes to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 state that conditional pleas
avoid the "unfortunate consequences" of litigating with the sole
purpose of preserving a pretrial issue for appellate review and cite
numerous practice manuals praising conditional guilty pleas as a
mechanism to avoid unnecessary trials. 75
Since a plea of guilty or nolo contendere waives many
significant rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution or the
applicable state constitution, courts require defendants to
voluntarily and intelligently enter such pleas. 76 If the plea is not
knowing and voluntary, "it is generally not regarded as valid and
binding."77 In federal and state systems, reaching a disposition
through plea bargaining is not merely a procedure permitted by
the courts; "it is the criminal justice system."78 The criminal
justice system heavily depends on informal bargaining between
litigants as opposed to formal court processes.7 9 Because of this
bargaining process, some courts have depended on contract
principles in upholding conditional plea agreements, even in the
absence of a statute or court rule explicitly permitting such a
73. 524 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Alaska 1974).
74. United States v. Bundy, 392 F.3d 641, 645 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
75. FED. R. GRIM. P. 11(a)(2) advisory committee's notes on 1983
amendments (citing ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIM.
JUSTICE, standard 21-1.3(c) (2d ed. 1978); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
P. § SS 290.1(4)(b) (1975); UNIF. R. OF CRIM. P., rule 444(d) (Approved Draft,
1974); 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-CRIMINAL § 175
(1969); 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.1 (1978))
76. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) & (2); R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 11
(requiring courts to advise defendant of the consequences of a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere and requiring that the plea be voluntary).
77. Cooksey, 524 P.2d at 1256.
78. Reimelt, supra note 3, at 873 (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
79. See United States v. Cox, 464 F.2d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 1972)
("Approximately 90% of all criminal proceedings commenced in the United
States district courts are settled by the entrance of a plea of guilty or one of
nolo contendere.") (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 264 n.1a
(1971) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
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procedure. For example, in addition to finding conditional guilty
pleas to be in the interest of judicial economy, the Colorado Court
of Appeals found "no justification for barring a stipulation
whereby a defendant pleads guilty to a charge on the condition
that he or she may nevertheless seek review of an adverse pretrial
ruling that directly affects that charge."80
In another decision, the Colorado Court of Appeals agreed
with the advisory committee notes on the 1983 amendments to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 that an evaluation of the
arguments for and against conditional guilty pleas demonstrated
"that the obvious advantages of a conditional plea procedure are
not outweighed by any significant or compelling disadvantages."8'
The advisory committee notes regarding Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(a)(2) and the Colorado Court of Appeals' Hoffman
decision illustrate approval of conditional guilty pleas through the
application of a balancing approach, a traditional means of
reconciling conflicting legal doctrines. 82
IV. ARGUMENT FOR RHODE ISLAND TO PERMIT
CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEAS
A. Judicial Economy
The most significant reason for allowing conditional pleas is
judicial economy and preservation of prosecutorial resources. If
defendants in Rhode Island were allowed to enter conditional
pleas, litigants would not be forced to put on sham trials in order
to save their appellate rights. The United States Supreme Court
has recognized that such trials may be "completely unnecessary
waste of time and energy" because the "trial" is nothing more than
a formality.8 3 Even so, Rhode Island and some other jurisdictions
emphatically insist that this "trial" via mechanical ritual is the
only way for defendants to preserve their right to appeal adverse
pretrial rulings.84
80. People v. Bachofer, 85 P.3d 615, 617 (Colo. App. 2003).
81. See People v. Hoffman, No. 08CA1008, 2010 Colo. App. LEXIS 493,
at *4 (Colo. App. Apr. 15, 2010).
82. See Hoffman, 2010 Colo. App. LEXIS 493, at *4; FED. R. CRIM. P.
11(a)(2) advisory committee's notes on 1983 amendments.
83. See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 292 (1975).
84. See State v. Keohane, 814 A.2d 327, 329 (R.I. 2003) (per curiam).
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Rhode Island's prohibition on conditional guilty pleas is in
direct contradiction to its clearly stated broad objectives: the
Rhode Island Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure provides
that the rules "shall be construed to secure simplicity in
procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay."85  The Rhode Island Supreme
Court's prohibition on conditional guilty pleas is directly opposed
to this commendable objective of eliminating unjustifiable expense
and delay in the state's trial court system. By refusing to permit
conditional guilty pleas, the Court not only sanctions but also
insists on expense and delay that is indeed unjustifiable. The
refusal to permit such pleas not only burdens criminal defendants
but, by absorbing valuable trial court time and resources, also has
a domino effect on other litigants and the public.
The practice and procedure of law is one imbued with history
and tradition, but as a musician's tempo is regulated by a
metronome, the legitimacy of our criminal justice system depends
in part on its ability to stay in time with the evolution of legal
scholarship, social norms, and the demand for legal process and
services. The Rhode Island Supreme Court's prohibition of
conditional pleas elevates form over substance and its lack of
persuasive rationale betrays an unwarranted stubbornness
towards examining in earnest the merits of conditional guilty
pleas in light of the needs of the state's criminal justice system.
When a defendant strategically litigates solely to preserve
appellate rights, the trial is "a waste of prosecutorial and judicial
resources, and causes delay in the trial of other cases."86 The
Fourth Circuit has said that the purpose of allowing conditional
guilty pleas is to avoid the wasteful litigation strategy of going to
trial simply to preserve pretrial issues for appellate review.8 7
Using a similar rationale, the American Bar Association has
concluded that "there is great value in modifying the traditional
view that a plea of guilty waives all non-jurisdictional defects
which could be raised by pretrial defensive motion."88 Permitting
85. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 2.
86. WRIGHT & LEIPOLD, supra note 7, § 174 n.1 (4th ed. 2008) (quoting
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2) advisory committee's notes on 1983 amendments).
87. U.S. v. Bundy, 392 F.3d 641, 645 (4th Cir. 2004).
88. AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS § 1.3 cmt.
c (1970).
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defendants to enter a conditional plea of guilty "avoids the
unfortunate situation where the only reason a defendant goes to
trial is to save the right to appeal denial of a pretrial motion to
suppress evidence." 89 "[lit is wasteful to force a sham trial" to
avoid "forfeiture of appellate review."90
Rhode Island needs its courts to conserve taxpayer funds
while simultaneously serving the interests of justice and
respecting the legal rights of all litigants.91 This is no easy task.
In formulating their rules, courts and advisory committees must
safeguard against sacrificing substantive rights in the name of
efficiency. A conditional guilty plea procedure, however, does not
result in the loss of any substantive rights. Rather, it encourages
defendants with credible pretrial arguments to assert those
arguments when those same defendants would not have done so
under Rhode Island's current plea regime. The time and resources
the courts would save through the use of conditional guilty pleas
would result in an increased availability of resources for criminal
defendants in the aggregate by reducing the burden on the
overextended Office of the Public Defender. 92  The dissenting
opinion in State v. Huy captured the exercise in senselessness that
can result under Rhode Island's current plea regime:
To preserve his appeal, the majority would have [the
defendant] go through the repetition of a proceeding in
which the state would call the exact same witnesses to
offer the same testimony that already had been offered at
the suppression hearing, and before the same trial
justice, sitting as fact-finder in a jury-waived trial. This
not only burdens the defendant by placing an
unnecessary roadblock to the exercise of the right to
appeal, but it also burdens the efficient administration of
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Katie Zezima, In Rhode Island, Deficit Keeps Growing, N.Y.
TIMES (May 18, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/18/us/18rhode.html?
partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (reporting on how Rhode Island's budget shortfall
will affect services available to its citizens).
92. See Tracy Breton, RI's Indigent Defense Fund Broke For Rest of
Fiscal Year, PROVIDENCE J. (May 24, 2010 5:21 PM), http://news.providence
journal.com/breaking-news/2010/05/ris-indigent-defense-fund-brok.html#.TtB
URnFdo7C.
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justice and strains judicial resources.93
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island must surely recognize the
potential for increased efficiency that would result from allowing
conditional guilty pleas. Thus, the Court must have additional,
though unsaid, reasons for its prohibition of conditional pleas.
B. The Benefits of Plea Bargaining, Both Real and Illusory
One recurring argument against permitting conditional guilty
pleas is that criminal defendants should not be able to reap the
benefits of both a trial and a guilty plea.94 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court's disdain for this aspect of conditional guilty pleas
was evident in its statement in State v. Dustin that it "w[ould] not
allow a defendant to . . . escape the consequences of admitting
guilt or pleading no contest" through a conditional plea-type
procedure. 95  A major incentive to enter a guilty plea is a
reduction in sentencing. The reduced sentence to which a
defendant assents through plea-bargaining appears to be a good
bargain for the defendant. However, "many of the bargains
gained by defendants in plea negotiation are more apparent than
real."96 "A more realistic basis on which to calculate the value of
the bargain" is "to determine the usual sentencing practice in
similar cases."9 7 If, for example, it is the government's practice to
offer a defendant less than the full sentence in a particular type of
case, then the defendant is not getting any significant value for
his concessions. There are of course some cases in which the
government offers a defendant a real bargain, but these tend to be
more complex cases in which the prosecution is less sure about its
chances at trial, and the defendant is most likely to prevail on his
constitutional claims. 98
It is undisputed that the American criminal justice system
could not function without reaching dispositions in a vast majority
93. 960 A.2d 550, 561-62 (R.I. 2008) (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
94. See supra Part II.
95. 874 A.2d 244, 247 (R.I. 2005); see also State v. Beechum, 933 A.2d
687, 690 (R.I. 2007) (use of impermissible procedure "ensured the state a
conviction and afforded defendant a reduced charge and a significantly
reduced sentence").
96. NEWMAN, supra note 53, at 98.
97. Id.
98. Conditional Guilty Pleas, supra note 11, at 565.
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of criminal cases not through trial, but through plea bargains. 99
Because of the immense pressure on defendants to plea bargain, it
is inevitable that some defendants will plead guilty when they are
actually innocent or when they have legitimate legal defenses.100
The uncertainty of a trial and the crippling expense of hiring a
defense attorney for even the simplest cases, combined with an
offer of a reduced sentence, make plea bargains difficult for many
defendants to resist. Guilty pleas, however, are erroneously
perceived as necessarily being confessions of guilt. 101
A regime prohibiting conditional guilty pleas fails, or is
unwilling, to distinguish legal guilt from factual guilt. Factual
guilt refers to whether the defendant did in fact commit the crime
he is accused of committing. 102 A defendant is said to be legally
guilty when the government has met its burden at trial by proving
each element of the charged offense with competent evidence.103
The defendant knows with divine certainty whether he is factually
guilty, whereas an adjudication of legal guilt is a court's
supposition that the defendant committed the crime charged. The
rationale for distinguishing legal guilt from factual guilt springs
from a concern for fairness in criminal proceedings and a desire to
protect individual rights. 104 Where evidence against a defendant
who is patently guilty has been obtained by illegal means, a court
may nevertheless find that defendant to be not guilty. 0 5
A defendant does not forfeit all constitutional rights upon a
99. See United States v. Cox, 464 F.2d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 1972).
100. Id. (noting that where defendants initially pled not guilty, their
choice to later plead guilty "was undoubtedly affected by the district court's
ruling on the motion to suppress and ... the likelihood of that ruling being
set aside on appeal").
101. C. RONALD HUFF, ARYE RATTNER & EDWARD SAGARIN, CONVICTED BUT
INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION & PUBLIC PoLIcY 74 (1996).
102. See Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State
Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L.
REV. 463, 465 n.6 (1980) (defining factual guilt as "the substantive criminal
law's definition of criminal conduct" and legal guilt as "procedural
requirements that the state must satisfy in an accusatorial system of justice
before it can apply the criminal sanction").
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) ("We hold that all
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is
... inadmissible in a state court.").
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finding of factual guilt. 0 6 A guilty plea "renders irrelevant those
constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid
establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way
of conviction if factual guilt is validly established.""o7 When a
conditional guilty plea is employed, the defendant most likely
seeks to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.os In this
scenario, a defendant's factual guilt is irrelevant and entering a
conditional plea permitting appeal is not logically inconsistent. 109
From a juror's perspective, separating factual guilt from legal
guilt may seem to be an absurd and impossible division, but our
criminal justice system insists that the two concepts can, and
must, be distinguished.' 10
C. Adversarial Stipulated Fact Trials are Creatures of the Judicial
Imagination
Justice Flaherty's dissenting opinion in State v. Huy cited
several cases in which the Rhode Island Supreme Court had
reached the merits of appeals based on pretrial motions to
suppress where there had been a stipulated facts trial in the court
below.'" The Court appears willing to reach the merits of an
appeal after a stipulated facts trial where it finds that the
procedure below was "sufficiently adversarial" and was not an
attempt to circumvent its rule against conditional pleas." 2 Such
a sanctimonious rule buckles under the weight of its own logic.
To prohibit conditional guilty pleas but to reach the merits of
106. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam).
107. Id.
108. See Paul F. Rothstein, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 69 A.B.A. J. 1838, 1839 (1983); see also Clark J. Brown, Comment,
Conditional Guilty Pleas in Arkansas: An Assessment and a Plea for Change,
63 ARK. L. REV. 557, 560 (2010) (citing United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31,
33 (2003)).
109. See Conditional Guilty Pleas, supra note 11, at 570.
110. See id. at 569.
111. State v. Huy, 960 A.2d 550, 558 n.8 (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (citing
State v. Swindell, 895 A.2d 100, 103-04 (R.I. 2006); State v. Black, 721 A.2d
826, 828 (R.I. 1998); State v. Roberts, 420 A.2d 837, 839 (R.I. 1980)).
112. See State v. Dustin, 874 A.2d 244, 247 (R.I. 2005); cf. State v. Paiva,
967 A.2d 1103, 1105 (R.I. 2009) (remanding for findings of fact because the
court was concerned that the proceedings in the trial court were
"insufficiently adversarial").
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an appeal after a stipulated facts trial where the court labels the
procedure below as "sufficiently adversarial" requires the Court to
perpetrate a pious fraud on itself and criminal defendants.113
Black's Law Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding" as "[a]
hearing involving a dispute between opposing parties."1 l4  The
belief that a proceeding where the parties have agreed to all the
essential facts, or at least those sufficient to meet the elements of
the charged offense, could ever be "adversarial" requires the Court
to willingly blind itself to undeniable truths. The United States
Supreme Court addressed this very point in Lefkowitz v. Newsome
when it made clear that "[t]he availability of federal habeas corpus
depends upon functional reality, not upon an infatuation with
labels."115  Branding a stipulated facts trial as "sufficiently
adversarial" does not convince anyone but the Court of any
meaningful distinction between that procedure and the practical
effect of a conditional guilty plea.
D. Conditional Guilty Plea Rules are Self-Limiting
The weakest reason for prohibiting conditional guilty pleas is
underpinned by the fear that a flood of litigation would ensue if
such pleas were permitted. A rule permitting conditional guilty
pleas, as formulated by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(a)(2), is self-limiting. Under that rule, on which many state
rules are modeled, a defendant must fulfill several requirements
in order to enter a valid conditional guilty plea. First, Rule
11(a)(2) requires the consent of the court. 116 This requirement
ensures that the appellate court will not be asked to adjudicate
the defendant's appeal based on an insufficient record.' 1 7 Second,
the government must also consent. 118 Third, the defendant must
reserve his right to a conditional plea in writing.119 Fourth, the
defendant must specify the pretrial motion on which his appeal is
based. 120 The limitations are "based on two separate, but related,
113. See supra note 1.
114. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 58 (8th ed. 2004).
115. 420 U.S. 283, 290 n.7 (1975).
116. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2).
117. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2) advisory committee's notes on 1983
amendments.
118. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2).
119. Id.
120. Id.
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concerns: first, that the conditional plea promote judicial economy,
and second, that the conditional plea not be employed in a manner
that renders appellate review difficult or impossible."'21
Some courts impose additional limitations on conditional
guilty pleas. One common requirement is that the conditional
plea be limited to case-dispositive issues. 122 Other jurisdictions
limit conditional guilty pleas to specific issues. For example, Rule
24.3(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure limits the
entry of a conditional guilty plea to defendants appealing the
"denial of a pretrial motion to suppress or a motion for speedy
trial." 23  As a further limitation, one case suggested that the
court "should give considerable weight to the Government's
assessment of the case."1 24 The inherent limits of the federal rule,
combined with empirical evidence that conditional guilty pleas do
not substantially increase the number of appeals, forecloses the
"flood of litigation" argument. 125
E. Finality
Probably the most persuasive reason to prohibit conditional
guilty pleas is the reduction in finality as compared to a
traditional guilty plea. However, sacrificing finality in entering a
conditional guilty plea actually results in a more streamlined case
since a conditional plea eliminates the intermediate step of a
sham trial before appeal. This streamlining effect is illustrated in
Paiva, where the defendant's pretrial motion was denied, and the
hearing justice scheduled the defendant's trial for later on that
same day. 126 Furthermore, although finality is a legitimate and
important objective, the United States Supreme Court has said
that it is "not to be achieved at the expense of a constitutional
121. United States v. Bundy, 392 F.3d 641, 646 (4th Cir. 2004).
122. Id. at 645-46 (citing United States v. Wise, 179 F.3d 184, 186 (5th
Cir. 1999)); see also TENN. R. CRIM. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(iv) (requiring issue on
appeal to be dispositive of the case).
123. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 108, at 565 (citing ARK. R. CRIM. P.
24.3(b)).
124. Bundy, 392 F.3d at 648.
125. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2) advisory committee's notes on 1983
amendments (citing John B. Mullady, Comment, Appellate Review of
Constitutional Infirmities Notwithstanding a Plea of Guilty, 9 Hous. L. REV.
305, 315-19 (1971)).
126. See State v. Paiva, 967 A.2d 1103, 1104 (R.I. 2009).
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right." 27 Conditional guilty pleas are "as final as any conviction
at trial that might be reversed on direct appeal, and [are]
certainly no less final than a plea of not guilty accompanied by
stipulation to the prosecution's case."1 28
V. CONCLUSION
In consideration of the ambiguous state of Rhode Island case
law, the lack of rationale supporting the Rhode Island Supreme
Court's prohibition on conditional guilty pleas, and the inefficiency
of Rhode Island's current guilty-plea regime, Rhode Island should
allow defendants to enter conditional guilty pleas. Rhode Island
is, of course, free to shape its own state criminal law. However, if
Rhode Island refuses to allow its citizens to benefit from a policy
that the American Bar Association, the United States Supreme
Court, federal courts, military courts, and a majority of states
have not only praised but actually implemented, it at least owes
criminal defendants and the public a thorough and well-
considered explanation as to the wisdom of its policy. "It is
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV."l 29
Rhode Island's prohibition of conditional guilty pleas might
not stretch back to the reign of Henry IV, but the Rhode Island
Supreme Court's continued adherence to its rule against
conditional guilty pleas is today unexplained and unexplainable.
In the 1790s Thomas Paine shrewdly observed, "the fraud being
once established, could not afterwards be explained; for it is with a
pious fraud as with a bad action, it begets a calamitous necessity
of going on."130  The prohibition of conditional guilty pleas in
Rhode Island has begotten a calamitous line of cases and the myth
of the sufficiently adversarial stipulated facts trial, an untenable
judicial invention that, unless the Court decides to permit
conditional guilty pleas, will out of necessity go on.
127. Conditional Guilty Pleas, supra note 11, at 574 (quoting Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323 (1979)).
128. Id. at 574-75.
129. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV.
457, 469 (1897).
130. PAINE, supra note 1, at 74.
